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What is the effect of the constitution on economic policy choices? This issue is often at the 
heart of debates on constitutional reform. Recently, Italy replaced its system of 
proportional representation, where legislators were elected according to the proportions of 
the popular national vote received by their parties, with one that includes ingredients of 
plurality rule, where legislators are elected in each district according to who receives the 
highest number of votes. Italian political leaders are now considering proposals to replace 
the current parliamentary regime with elements of presidentialism, where the head of 
government is elected by direct popular vote. An important motivation for these reforms 
was the idea that they would reduce political corruption and the propensity of Italian 
governments to run budget deficits. 
 In recent years, a number of other countries have implemented related reforms.  
For instance, New Zealand altered its system of plurality rule in single-member districts to 
a system mixing elements of proportional representation.  Japan moved to a system that 
mixes elements of proportional and plurality representation from its special form of plurality 
rule (the so-called single non-transferable vote. The UK has debated similar proposals. 
What are the effects of these reforms on economic policy outcomes and economic 
performance?  
It is only recently that this question has been addressed by social scientists.  
Political scientists specializing in comparative politics have described the fundamental 
features of constitutions and their political effects. Yet they have mainly focused on 
political phenomena, failing to study how constitutional rules shape economic policies.  
Although economists in the field of political economics have studied the determinants of 
policy choices, they rarely study constitutional details and their implications for policy 
choice and economic performance.  
This chapter discusses recent theoretical and empirical research on one feature of 
modern democracies: the electoral rule. Our central conclusion is that the electoral rule 
systematically shapes economic policy. We show that to understand the extent of political 
corruption, the devil is in the details of electoral systems, such as the ballot structure or 
district magnitude. In the case of the size of government and fiscal policy outcomes, the 
effects are associated with the broad distinction between proportional vs majoritarian 
systems. The effects are often large enough to be of genuine economic interest.   
A closely related question concerns the effects on economic policy of the 
constitutional rules that define the form of government, especially the crucial distinction 
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between parliamentary and presidential systems.  We do not address this topic here and 
refer the interested reader to Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004a).  
We develop our arguments as follows. Section 1 outlines some key objectives of 
electoral rules and notes the stability and systematic selection that characterize real world 
constitutions.  Section 2 introduces the main concepts that categorize different electoral 
rules.  Section 3 explains how these elements shape the accountability of government and 
the size of political rents and corruption.  Section 4 deals with representation in 
government and a variety of fiscal policy choices.  Section 5 offers our conclusions and 
brief comments on emerging research.   
 
1. Electoral systems: Motives, stability and selection 
 
In a representative democracy, elected officials determine policy.  Electoral systems 
decide how well voters can hold politicians accountable and which groups in society are 
more likely to see their interests represented. 
 Economists in the field of corporate finance show that alternative rules of corporate 
governance entail a trade off between agency problems and representation of minority 
interests. Rules that concentrate powers in the hands of a dominant shareholder reduce 
managerial discretion and limit the scope of the agency problem, but this control is likely to 
come at the expense of minority shareholders (cf. for instance Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 
2003).  
A similar tradeoff between accountability and representation arises in the design of 
electoral rules.  Indeed, this idea is familiar to political scientists in the field of comparative 
politics (see e.g., Bingham Powell; 2000, Prezworski et al., 1999).  Compared to 
proportional representation, plurality rule in single member districts translates swings in 
voter sentiment into larger changes in legislative majorities. This leverage effect of plurality 
rule strengthens the incentives of politicians to please the voters, leading to smaller 
political rents and less corruption. But since it makes political candidates more responsive 
to the wishes of pivotal groups of voters, stronger accountability also raises the propensity 
to target benefits to narrow constituencies. This targeting comes at the expense of broad 
spending programs that benefit many citizens. Hence the design of electoral rules entails a 
tradeoff between accountability and representation.   
Overall features of electoral systems change very seldom.  In the sample of 60 
democracies studied by Persson and Tabellini (2003), only two enacted important reforms 
of the electoral system between 1960 and 1990 (Cyprus and France) – though more 
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reforms are observed if one considers marginal changes and transitions from autocracy to 
democracy. At the same time, the electoral system is strongly correlated with stable 
country characteristics:  former British colonies tend to have U.K.-style plurality rule in 
single-member districts, while continental Europe predominantly has proportional 
representation.   
These patterns make it difficult to draw causal inferences from the data.  Electoral 
stability means that reforms are very seldom observed; but cross-country comparisons risk 
confounding the effects of the constitution with other country characteristics, since the 
electoral rule itself could be selected on the basis of unobserved variables that also 
influence policy outcomes.  
In our own work, we have exploited econometric techniques developed by labor 
economists to estimate the causal effects of non-random treatments from cross-sectional 
comparisons. For us, treatment is the electoral reform. We have relied on three estimation 
methods. First, we isolate exogenous variation in electoral rules through instrumental 
variables. If change is very rare, it may be largely determined by historical circumstances 
(whatever was “fashionable” at the time). The broad period in which the current 
constitution was adopted can thus be used as an instrument for the electoral system. The 
identifying assumption is that, controlling for other determinants of policy (including the age 
of democracy), the birth period of the constitution is not directly related to current policy 
outcomes.  Second, we adjust the estimates for possible correlation between the random 
components of policy outcomes and the selection of electoral systems, as suggested by 
Heckman and others. Third, we exploit so-called “matching methods” where countries are 
ranked by the probability of adopting a specific electoral system, called a propensity score.  
Comparisons of countries with similar propensity scores, but with different actual systems, 
receive more weight. This third method avoids biased estimates due to heterogeneous 
treatment effects.  Persson and Tabellini (2003) discuss these three estimation methods in 
context, while Acemoglu (2005) provides a critical review.  
 
2. Categorizing electoral systems   
 
Political scientists commonly emphasize three aspects of electoral rules for legislatures.  
Electoral formulas translate votes into seats. Under plurality rule, only the winner(s) 
of the highest vote share(s) are elected in a given district. In contrast, proportional 
representation awards legislative seats in proportion to votes in each district. To ensure 
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closeness between overall vote shares and seat shares, a district system of plurality rule is 
often amended by a system of “adjustment seats” at the national level.  
  District magnitudes reflect the number of legislators (given the size of the 
legislature) acquiring a seat in a typical voting district. One polar case is where all districts 
have a single seat, as in the U.S. House of Representatives; the other polar case is where 
all legislators are all elected in a single, all-encompassing district, such as the Israeli 
Knesset. See Grofman (this volume) for a more extended discussion.  
Ballot structures determine how citizens cast their ballot. One possibility is that they 
choose among individual candidates. Another common possibility is that each voter 
chooses from a set of closed lists of candidates drawn up by the parties participating in the 
election. In the latter, if an electoral district has ten seats and Party A wins, say, four of 
these seats, the first four candidates on the list of Party A get elected.1 
  Although these three aspects are theoretically distinct, their use is correlated across 
countries.  Anglo-Saxon countries often implement plurality rule with voting for individual 
candidates in single-member districts. Others implement proportional representation 
though a system of closed party lists in large districts, sometimes a single national district. 
In the wake of this pattern, many observers have classified countries into two archetypical 
electoral systems, labelled “majoritarian” and “proportional” (or “consensual”).  These 
correlations are nonetheless not perfect, and several countries employ “mixed” electoral 
system.  German voters, e.g., cast two ballots, electing half the Bundestag by plurality in 
single-member districts, and the other half by proportional representation at a national 
level, to achieve proportionality between national vote and seat shares. Furthermore, 
some proportional representation systems, such as the Irish, do not rely on party lists.2   
Blais and Massicotte (1996) and Cox (1997) present overviews of world electoral systems. 
 
3.  Accountability 
 
How do electoral rules affect accountability? In this section, we consider only policies 
evaluated in roughly the same way by all voters (so-called valence issues), leaving the 
problem of how elected officials react to disagreement among voters for the next section 
that focuses on representation. Accountability in this context refers to two things.  It gives 
                                                 
1 The distinction between open and closed party lists is discussed further below. 
 
2 To achieve proportionality, the Irish “single transferable vote” system (also used in Malta) relies on votes over 
individuals in multi-member districts where each voter can only vote for a single candidate, and a complicated 
procedure where seats are awarded sequentially and votes for losing candidates are transferred from one seat to the next.   
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voters some control over politicians who abuse their power: voters can punish or reward 
politicians through re-election or other career concerns, and this creates incentives for 
good behavior.  Accountability also refers to the ability of voters to select the most “able” 
candidate, where ability can be interpreted as integrity, technical expertise, or other 
intrinsic features valued by voters at large.  As the emphasis of this chapter is on 
economic policymaking, we focus on how the electoral rule affects corruption, rent 
seeking, and electoral budget cycles.  
The details of electoral rules have direct effects on the incentives of politicians. 
They also have indirect effects through party structure and, more generally, who holds 
office.  We consider the direct and indirect effects of the three aspects of electoral rules 
mentioned above: ballot structure, district magnitude and the electoral formula. 
 
3.1 Direct effects  
Politicians have stronger direct incentives to please the voters if they are held accountable 
individually, rather than collectively. Because they disconnect individual efforts and re-
election prospects, party lists discourage effort by office-holders. Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) formalize this idea and predict that political rents will be higher under electoral 
systems that rely on list voting, than in systems where voters directly select individual 
candidates.  The same argument also implies that open lists (voters can modify the order 
of candidates) should be more conducive to good behavior than closed lists (non-
amendable by voters), as should preferential voting (voters are asked to rank candidates 
of the same party). 
What does the evidence say?  If higher political rents are associated with illegal 
benefits, then we can study whether corruption by public officials in different countries is 
systematically correlated to the electoral rule. Of course, corruption is only an imperfect 
proxy for political rents. Furthermore, corruption is measured with error and is determined 
by many other country features. 
Cross-sectional and panel data suggest some connections.  Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) and Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) study about 80 democracies in the 1990s. 
They measure corruption as perceived through surveys assembled by the World Bank, 
Transparency International and private risk services. They also control for country 
characteristics that earlier studies have found to correlate with corruption, notably per 
capita income, openness to international trade, the citizens’ education and religious 
beliefs, a country’s history as captured by colonial heritage, and geographic location as 
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measured by a set of dummy variables. The ballot structure is indeed strongly correlated 
with corruption: a switch from a system with all legislators elected on party lists, to plurality 
rule with all legislators individually elected, would reduce perceptions of corruption by as 
much as 20 percent. This is about twice the estimated effect of being in Latin America. The 
decline in corruption is stronger when individual voting is implemented by plurality rule, 
rather than by using preferential voting or open lists in proportional electoral systems. Of 
course, the result could also reflect effects of the electoral formula (as discussed below), 
rather than just the ballot structure. Kunicova and Rose Ackerman (2001) obtain similar 
empirical results, although they single out closed-list, proportional representation systems 
as the most conducive to corruption.    
 Some of these conclusions run counter to those in Carey and Shugart (1995) and 
Golden and Chang (2001), who instead emphasize the distinction between inter-party and 
intra-party competition. These scholars argue that competition between parties is 
desirable, as it leads to legislation that pleases voters at large. In contrast, competition 
within parties is not desirable, as it leads candidates to provide favors to their 
constituencies, through patronage and other illegal activities. The Italian and Japanese 
electoral systems before the 1990s reforms are deemed to exemplify this problem. 
Measuring corruption by judicial inquiries against Italian members of parliament, Golden 
and Chang (2001) show that corruption is more frequent in districts with more intense 
intra-party competition. They conclude that open-list systems are worse than closed-list 
systems, and claim that the empirical results by Kunicova and Rose Ackerman (2001) 
reflect a misspecified model (see also Golden and Chang, 2003).  
Summarizing the argument so far, both theory and evidence suggest that individual 
accountability under plurality rule strengthens the incentives of politicians to please the 
voters and is conducive to good behavior. But the effects of individual accountability under 
proportional representation, implemented with open rather than closed lists, are more 
controversial.  
The electoral formula, including district magnitude, seems to affect the incentives for 
politicians also in other ways.  Under plurality rule, the mapping from votes to seats 
becomes steep when electoral races are close. This connection ought to create strong 
incentives for good behavior: a small improvement in the chance of victory would create a 
large return in terms of seats. The incentives under proportional representation are 
weaker, as additional effort has a lower expected return on seats (or on the probability of 
winning). If electoral races have likely winners, however, incentives may instead be 
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weaker under plurality than proportional representation: if seats are next to certain, little 
effort goes into pleasing the voters of those districts.3  Aggregating over all districts (and 
thus over races of different closeness), the relative incentives to extract rents under 
different electoral formulas become an empirical question. Strömberg ‘s (2003) results 
bear on these arguments. Employing a theoretical and structurally estimated model of the 
U.S. Electoral College, he studies the effects of a (hypothetical) reform to a national vote 
for president. Given the empirical distribution of voter preferences, he finds that the 
incentives for rent extraction are basically unaffected by such a reform.   
 
3.2 Indirect effects 
Electoral rules (and in particular district magnitude) also have indirect effects on 
accountability, by altering the set of candidates that have a chance to be elected, or more 
generally by changing the party system.   
Myerson (1993) presents a model in which barriers to entry allow dishonest 
candidates to survive. He assumes that parties (or equivalently, candidates) differ in two 
dimensions: honesty and ideology. Voters always prefer honest candidates, but disagree 
on ideology. With proportional representation and multi-member district, honest candidates 
are always available for all ideological positions, so dishonest candidates have no chance 
of being elected. But in single-member districts, only one candidate can win the election. 
Voters may then cast their ballot, strategically, for dishonest but ideologically preferred 
candidates, if they expect all other voters with the same ideology to do the same: switching 
to an honest candidate risks giving the victory to a candidate of the opposite ideology.  
Thus, plurality rule in single-member districts can be associated with dishonest 
incumbents, whom it is difficult to oust from office. 
But electoral systems that make it easy for political parties to be represented in 
parliament (for example, multi-member districts and proportional representation) may 
actually encourage rent seeking, through another channel. If many factions are 
represented in parliament, the government is more likely to be supported by a coalition of 
parties, rather than by a single party.  Under single-party government, voters know 
precisely whom to blame or reward for observed performance. Under coalition 
government, voters may not know whom to blame, and the votes lost for bad performance 
are shared amongst all coalition partners; this dilutes the incentives of individual parties to 
                                                 
3 Of course, districts can be redesigned at will at some intervals, which makes the closeness of elections an endogenous 
choice.  This possibility opens up the door for strategic manipulation (gerrymandering) where protection of incumbents 
is one of several possible objectives.  
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please the voters. These ideas are discussed by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) and 
Bingham Powell (2000). 
Do the data shed light on these alternative predictions? The hypothesis that 
coalition governments are associated with more corruption remains untested, as far as we 
know, though some of the blatant corruption scandals in Europe – Belgium and Italy – 
have been intimately associated with such governments. Other evidence supports the idea 
that barriers to entry raise corruption, however. Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson, 
Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) find corruption to be higher in countries and years with small 
district magnitude (that is, few legislators elected in each district), again with large 
quantitative effects. Alt and Lassen (2002) show that restrictions on primaries in 
gubernatorial elections, that raise barriers to entry for new candidates, are positively 
associated with perceptions of corruption in U.S. states.  
 We have thus far emphasized the implications of the electoral rule for political rents 
and corruption. A strong incentive of political representatives to please the voters can also 
show up in electoral policy cycles, however.  Persson and Tabellini (2003) consider panel 
data from 1960 covering about 500 elections in over 50 democracies. They classify 
countries in two groups according to the electoral formula and estimate the extent of 
electoral cycles in different specifications, including fixed country and time effects and 
other regressors.  Governments elected under plurality rule tend to cut taxes and 
government spending during election years, by about 0.5% of GDP. In proportional 
representation democracies, tax cuts are less pronounced, and no spending cuts are 
observed.  This finding is consistent with better accountability under plurality rule, allowing 
voters to punish governments for high taxes and spending either because they are fiscal 
conservatives (as in Peltzman, 1992) or because they are subject to a political agency 
problem (as in Persson and Tabellini, 2000 or Besley and Case, 1995).   
 
3.3 Summing up 
What does all of this imply about the consequences of electoral reforms for corruption?   
Because it would entail changing several features of the electoral rule, a large-scale 
reform from “proportional” to “majoritarian” elections would have ambiguous effects. A 
switch from proportional representation to plurality rule, accompanied by a change in the 
ballot structure from party lists to voting over individuals, would strengthen political 
incentives for good behavior, both directly and indirectly through the type of government. 
But these welfare-improving effects might be offset if the reform diminishes district 
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magnitude, thus erecting barriers to entry to the detriment of honest or talented 
incumbents. The net effects of electoral reform thus depend on which channel is stronger, 
and on the precise architecture of reform.  The empirical evidence in Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) and Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) support this nuanced conclusion. After 
controlling for other variables and taking into account the self-selection of countries into 
constitutions, they find no robust difference in corruption across a broad classification of 
majoritarian vs. proportional electoral systems.  
 
4.  Representation 
 
Economic policy generates conflicts of interest.  Individuals and groups in society differ in 
many dimensions: they have different levels and sources of income, work in different 
sectors and occupations, live in different geographic areas, and possess different 
ideologies. As a result, people differ in their views about public policies: the appropriate 
level and structure of taxation, the preferred structure of tariffs, subsidies, and regulations, 
the support for programs aimed at different regions, and so on. Electoral rules help 
aggregate such conflicting interests into public policy decisions, but the weight given to 
specific groups varies with the system.  In this section we discuss how this influences 
fiscal policy choices. 
 
4.1 Direct effects on the composition of government spending  
Single-member districts and plurality vote both tend to pull in the direction of narrowly 
targeted programs benefiting small geographic constituencies. Conversely, multi-member 
districts and proportional representation induce politicians to provide benefits for broad 
groups of voters. Building on this insight, some recent papers have studied the influence of 
district magnitude and the electoral formula on the composition of government spending. 
Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000, Ch. 8) study electoral competition between two 
opportunistic and office-seeking parties.  Multimember districts and proportional 
representation diffuse electoral competition, giving the parties strong incentives to seek 
electoral support from broad coalitions in the population through general public goods or 
universalistic redistributive programs (e.g., public pensions or other welfare programs). In 
contrast, single-member districts and plurality rule typically make each party a sure winner 
in some of the districts, concentrating electoral competition in the other pivotal districts. 
Both parties thus have a strong incentive to target voters in these swing districts. 
Strömberg (2003) considers the effect of the Electoral College on the allocation of 
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campaign resources or policy benefits in his afore-mentioned structural model of the 
election for U.S. president. He shows empirically that this election method implies a much 
more lopsided distribution across states, where spending is focused on states where a 
relatively small number of votes might tip the entire state, compared to a (counterfactual) 
system of a national vote.   
Moreover, the winner-takes-all property of plurality rule reduces the minimal 
coalition of voters needed to win the election. Under plurality rule, a party can control the 
legislature with only 25% of the national vote: half the vote in half the districts. Under full 
proportional representation, 50% percent of the national vote is needed, which gives 
politicians a stronger incentive to provide benefits for many voters. This point has been 
made in different frameworks. Lizzeri and Persico (2001) study a model with binding 
electoral promises, where candidates can use tax revenue to provide either (general) 
public goods or targeted redistribution. Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 9) consider a 
broad or narrow policy choice by an incumbent policymaker trying to win re-election.  
Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) obtain similar results in a model where policy is set in post-
election bargaining among the elected politicians. They also predict that proportional 
elections lead to a bigger overall size of spending. 
 Is the evidence consistent with the prediction that proportional electoral systems 
lead to more spending in broad redistributive programs, such as public pensions and 
welfare spending? Without controlling for other determinants of welfare spending, 
legislatures elected under proportional electoral systems spend much more in social 
security and welfare compared to majoritarian elections: on average, the difference is 
about 8% of GDP. Controlling for other determinants of social security and welfare 
spending, such as demographics, per capita income, the age and quality of democracy, 
this magnitude shrinks to 2-3% of GDP and remains statistically significant. This estimate 
is robust to the sample of countries and to taking into account the non-random nature of 
electoral systems (cf. Milesi-Ferretti et al, 2002 and Persson and Tabellini, 2003, 2004b).   
If politicians have stronger incentives to vie for electoral support through broad 
spending programs under proportional representation than under plurality rule, we might 
expect to observe systematic differences around election time in the two systems. Persson 
and Tabellini (2003) indeed find a significant electoral cycle in welfare-state spending – 
expansions of such budget items in election and post-election years – in proportional 
representation systems, but not in plurality systems.  
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4.2 Indirect effects on the overall size of government spending 
The papers discussed so far in this section focus on the incentives of individual 
candidates, in a two party system. Many studies of comparative politics, however, observe 
that electoral rules also shape party structure and types of government. Plurality rule and 
small district magnitude produce fewer parties and a more skewed distribution of seats 
than proportional representation and large district magnitude (for example, Duverger, 1954 
and Lijphart, 1990).  Moreover, in parliamentary democracies few parties mean more 
frequent single-party majority governments, and less frequent coalition governments 
(Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Strom, 1990).  Evidence presented in Persson, Roland 
and Tabellini (2003) suggests that these political effects of the electoral rule may be large.  
In about 50 parliamentary democracies, proportional electoral rule is associated with a 
more fragmented party system, more frequent coalition governments and less frequent 
governments ruled by a single-party majority.   
It would be surprising if such large political effects did not also show up in the 
economic policies implemented by these different party systems and types of government. 
Indeed, a few recent papers have argued that the more fractionalized party systems 
induced by proportional elections lead to a greater overall size of government spending.  
For example, Austen-Smith (2000) studies a model where redistributive tax policy is set in 
post-election bargaining. He assumes that there are fewer parties under plurality rule (two 
parties) than under proportional representation (three parties). The coalition of two parties 
spends and taxes more compared to the single-party.  But here the number and size of 
parties is not allowed to depend on policy choices, imposing an artificial constraint on 
political competition. 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) and Bawn and Rosenbluth (2003) also predict 
that proportional representation leads to more government spending than plurality rule; but 
they treat the number of parties as endogenous and stress how the type of government 
determines the nature of electoral competition. When the government relies on a single-
party majority, the main competition for votes is between the incumbent and the 
opposition; this pushes the incumbent towards efficient policies, or at least towards 
policies that benefit the voters represented in office. If instead the government is supported 
by a coalition of parties, voters can discriminate between the parties in government and 
this creates electoral conflict inside the coalition. Under plausible assumptions, 
inefficiencies in bargaining induce excessive government spending.   
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These theoretical predictions are supported by the data: without conditioning on 
other determinants of fiscal policy, legislatures elected under proportional representation 
spend about 10% of GDP more than legislatures elected under plurality rule.  Careful 
estimates obtained from cross-country data confirm this result. Persson and Tabellini 
(2003, 2004b) consider a sample of 80 democracies in the 1990s, controlling for a variety 
of other policy determinants (including the distinction between presidential and 
parliamentary democracy) and allow for self-selection of countries into electoral systems.  
Their estimates are very robust, and imply that proportional representation rather than 
plurality rule raises total expenditures by central government by a whopping 5% of GDP.4 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) focus on 50 parliamentary democracies, 
identifying the effect of electoral rules on spending either from the cross-sectional 
variation, or from the time-series variation around electoral reforms. They find spending to 
be higher under proportional elections by an amount similar to that found by Persson and 
Tabellini (2003, 2004b). But here the effect seems to be entirely due to a higher incidence 
of coalition governments in proportional electoral systems. This conclusion is reached by 
testing an over-identifying restriction that follows from the underlying theoretical model. 
Several features of the electoral rule -- such as the electoral formula, district magnitude 
and minimum thresholds for being represented in parliament -- are jointly used as 
instruments for the type of government. The data cannot reject the restriction that all these 
measures of electoral systems are valid instruments for the type of government; that is, the 
electoral rule only influences government spending through the type of government, with 
no direct effects of the electoral rule on spending. Earlier empirical papers that treated the 
type of government as exogenous also find evidence that larger parliamentary coalitions 
spend more (e.g. Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999; Baqir, 2002).   
As noted above, the selection of countries into electoral systems is certainly not 
random, and some of the empirical research takes account of this (in particular, Persson 
and Tabellini, 2003, 2004b). But Ticchi and Vindigni (2003) and Iversen and Soskice 
(2003) note a particularly subtle problem: at least in the OECD countries, proportional 
electoral rule is frequently associated with center-left governments, while right-wing 
governments are more frequent under majoritarian elections. This correlation, rather than 
the prevalence of coalition governments, could explain why proportional representation 
systems spend more.  
                                                 
4 Variables held constant in the underlying regressions include per capita income, the quality and age of democracy, 
openness of the economy, the size and age composition of the population, plus indicators for federalism, OECD 
membership, colonial history, and continental location. Various estimation techniques produced similar results. 
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But why should the electoral rule be correlated with government ideology? These 
papers argue that majoritarian elections concentrate power, which tends to favor the 
wealthy.  In such systems, the argument goes, minorities (groups unlikely to benefit from 
spending, irrespective of who holds office) would rather see fiscal conservatives than fiscal 
liberals in office, since this reduces their tax burden. Hence, in winner-takes-all systems, 
conservative parties have an electoral advantage. If electoral rules are chosen on the 
basis of the policies they will deliver, this might explain the observed correlation: where the 
center-left voters dominate proportional systems have been selected, whereas majoritarian 
systems have been selected where conservatives dominate.  The empirical results by 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) cast some doubt on this line of thought, however. If 
indeed the electoral rule influences policy through the ideology of governments, rather 
than through the number of parties in government, the electoral rule cannot be a valid 
instrument for the incidence of coalition governments in a regression on government 
spending – contrary to the findings discussed above. 
 
4.3 Indirect effects on budget deficits 
Finally, if bargaining inefficiencies inside coalition governments lead to high spending, they 
may also produce other distortions.  Several papers have studied inter-temporal fiscal 
policy, treating the type of government as exogenous, but arguing that coalition 
governments face more severe “common-pool problems.” The latter concept refers to the 
tendency for over-exploitation when multiple users make independent decisions on how 
much to exploit a common resource such as fish; the analogy to this common resource is 
current and future tax revenue. In reviewing the extensive work on government budget 
deficits, Alesina and Perotti (1995) draw on the work by Velasco (1999) to argue that 
coalition governments are more prone to run deficits. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998, 
1999) and von Hagen (this volume) explicitly link the severity of the common-pool problem 
to electoral systems and argue that this has implications for the appropriate form of 
budgetary process.  
 The experiences of European and Latin American countries suggest a second 
reason why coalition governments might be prone to run budget deficits. As coalition 
governments have more players who could potentially veto a change, they may be less 
able to alter policy in the wake of adverse shocks (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991). These ideas are related to those in Tsebelis (1995, 1999, 2002), where a 
large number of veto players tends to “lock in”' economic policy and reduce its ability to 
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respond to shocks. In Tsebelis's conception, proportional elections often lead to multiple 
partisan veto players in government and thus to more policy myopia, even though the 
electoral rule is not the primitive in his analysis.  
Finally, changes of government or the threat of government crisis are more frequent 
under proportional elections (due to the greater incidence of minority and coalition 
governments). And governments facing a vote on their own survival are more likely to 
behave myopically and run large budget deficits (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991). 
A priori, this argument could also go the other way, however. In a coalition government, 
some parties will remain in government for a long time, despite changes in the coalition. 
With plurality rule, the party in power this time may be completely out of power next time. 
So the party in power today will take the money and run. In other words, political instability 
(i.e. large swings in political majorities), rather than government instability, undermines 
fiscal prudence (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). 
The empirical evidence confirms that proportional electoral systems behave more 
myopically.  In the raw data, budget deficits are larger by about 1% of GDP in legislatures 
elected under proportional representation, compared to those elected under plurality rule.  
Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that, when controlling for other determinants of policy, 
this difference grows to about 2 percent of GDP and is statistically significant in a large 
sample of democracies. There is also evidence that the electoral rule is correlated with 
government reaction to economic shocks: in proportional democracies, spending as a 
share of GDP rises in recessions but does not decline in booms, while cyclical fluctuations 
tend to have symmetric impacts on fiscal policy under other electoral systems.  
   
5. Discussion   
 
One of the principal conclusions of this chapter is that electoral reforms entail a trade off 
between accountability and representation, as political scientists have suggested, and this 
has sharp implications for economic policy outcomes. This tradeoff shows up in the direct 
effects of the electoral rule on incentives of political candidates, as well as the indirect 
effects on party structure and type of government.  
Plurality rule strengthens accountability. It does so directly, by reinforcing the 
incentives of politicians to please the voters, which results in smaller political rents and 
less corruption. But plurality rule also makes political candidates more responsive to the 
wishes of pivotal groups of voters, which increases the propensity to target benefits to 
narrow constituencies, at the expense of broad and universalistic programs such as 
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welfare-state spending and general public goods. We surveyed a range of evidence 
suggesting that both effects are quantitatively important. 
 Electoral rules also have indirect effects on policy outcomes, through the party 
structure.  Small district magnitude combined with plurality rule results in fewer political 
parties.  This makes it more difficult to oust dishonest or incompetent incumbents, because 
voters often support such incumbents over honest but ideologically opposed challengers. 
Fewer parties also reduce the incidence of coalition governments (in parliamentary 
democracies), and this is likely to lead to more efficient policies. As these indirect effects 
work in opposite directions, the overall impact on accountability is ambiguous. The 
approach also reveals that the overall size of government and budget deficits are much 
larger under coalition governments, and the latter are promoted by proportional 
representation and large district magnitude.   
 Whether economists or political scientists, at the end of the day we are interested 
not only in economic policies, but also in their overall effects on economic performance.  
The interaction between electoral systems, other political institutions, and economic 
development is one of the most exciting new areas of research at the boundary between 
economics and political science. As discussed by Helpman (2004), progress in this area 
will have to combine insights not only from these two disciplines, but also from sociology, 
and from many branches of economics, such as macroeconomics, economic 
development, political economics and economic history. This line of research will also 
have to focus on the distinction between democratic and autocratic forms of government, 
trying to understand which features of democratic institutions make democracy more 
stable, and how the quality of democracy interacts with specific institutional features. 
Although it is still premature to review this rapidly evolving line of research, one thing is 
sure. When such a review is written a few years down the line, the state of our knowledge 
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